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Abstract: Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy,  
and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states  
and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply 
too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show 
that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks 
it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they 
do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security 
is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend 
that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if 
their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce 
extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security 
is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that  
as well.




Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. are currently considering reducing their foreign 
aid budget and increasing their national security budget.2 Political realists 
would probably find this trend acceptable, since they regard national security 
as having priority over a state’s moral pursuits, especially over moral pursuits 
benefiting people in other states. Realists argue that in an international arena 
devoid of authority, acting morally towards others is simply too dangerous.
Critics have pointed out the many flaws in the realist view. Acting morally in 
the international arena does not always come at a cost for national security (in 
fact, acting morally may sometimes enhance security). International relations 
are not devoid of any authority. States are subject to authoritative international 
rules and governance institutions which facilitate cooperation and relieve states 
1   Winner of the 2017 Annual Jonathan Trejo-Mathys Essay Prize.
2   Washington Post Staff, ‘What Trump proposed cutting in his 2019 budget’, The Washington Post, February 16, 2018, 
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/12/trump-releases-new-federal-budget-with-big-hike-fo/> 
(Accessed: 28 February 2018); Emma Vardy, ‘Foreign aid to be shifted to support UK policy, Johnson says’, BBC News, 
December 31, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42528712> (Accessed: 28 February 2018); Merran Hitchick, 
‘Defence Spending up in Budget, Foreign Aid down’, The Guardian, May 9, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/
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of having to be primarily concerned with security.3
However, critics of realism do not go far enough. They leave realism’s 
normative core untouched. Implicitly – and sometimes even openly – critics 
grant that in those situations in which national security is truly at stake states 
are allowed to leave moral concern for foreigners aside if necessary. This is a 
significant concession, since (as I argue below) there are indeed situations in 
which states are forced to tradeoff between national security and moral concern 
for foreigners. My aim in this article is to develop the critique against realism 
further by showing that realism’s normative core can be challenged. National 
security does not have priority over at least one moral duty towards foreigners: 
the duty to reduce extreme global poverty.
This article is structured as follows. The first section describes in some detail 
the strongest argument that realists offer for their view, what I call the ‘argument 
from anarchy.’ The second section shows the main shortcomings in current 
critiques against that argument. The third section assesses and rejects the main 
normative premise in the anarchy argument. The fourth section considers two 
possible realist replies which are based on the idea of role duties and the idea of 
reasonable priority for compatriots.
The realist argument from anarchy
The kind of international political realism I am concerned with in this article 
is defined by the claim that national security has priority over, or outweighs, 
moral concerns. National security or defense is the activity of protecting a state, 
its inhabitants, its community, or some national value from violent aggression; 
or, alternatively, national security is the state of affairs in which protection from 
aggression adequately obtains. Realists offer different arguments for claiming 
that national security has priority. Here I focus on what is often regarded as the 
strongest realist argument,4 what I call the ‘argument from anarchy.’ It can be 
summarized as follows:
A. The international arena is anarchic.
B. Complying with moral duties in anarchic arenas always comes at a 
cost for national security.
C. National security has priority over all moral duties.
D. Therefore, every state is always allowed to disregard its moral duties 
towards other states and their inhabitants.
3   Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
Ch. 1; Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 136-140; Jack Donnelly, 
‘Twentieth-Century Realism’, in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 85-111.
4  Beitz (1979), p. 27.
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The argument from anarchy does not necessarily assume moral skepticism as 
a starting point. On the contrary, the argument is compatible with claiming that 
every state has moral duties, even towards other states and their inhabitants. But 
the argument highlights that, given certain structural features of international 
relations, acting morally towards others compromises national security. Now, 
national security should be the paramount concern for a state. Therefore, states 
are allowed to disregard less important concerns, including all moral concerns 
for other states and their inhabitants. Let us see the premises in this argument 
in more detail.
Premise A in the argument from anarchy claims that international relations are 
anarchic. In the international relations literature there are several definitions 
of ‘anarchy,’ all of which refer to the absence of (de facto) authority.5 Some 
definitions refer to the absence of authority in general, while others refer to the 
absence of some specific kind of authority (such as a government, an authorized 
enforcement agent, etc.).6 For the argument from anarchy to work, there is 
no need to refer to a specific kind of authority. Anarchy can be defined by the 
absence of an authority of any kind that is effective in restricting aggressive 
behavior between agents.
When relations between agents are anarchic, agents are unsure whether others 
will behave aggressively towards them. Adapting to this sort of uncertainty 
may require considerable time and energy. According to realist authors, 
international relations are indeed anarchic.7 These authors claim that there 
is no authority effectively restricting aggressions by states.8 Thus, states have 
to devote considerable efforts to making sure that no state will be aggressive 
towards them, and to defending themselves when others do act aggressively.
Premise B says that complying with moral duties in anarchic arenas always 
comes at a cost for national security, so ‘states in anarchy cannot afford to be 
moral.’9 Incompatibility, or conflict, between two aims occurs when those aims 
cannot be simultaneously realized because realizing each of them requires 
spending resources from a single limited pool of resources (or capital, goods, 
5   A rule (or set of rules) has de facto authority when an agent (or a set of agents) habitually regards the rule as binding 
and obeys it. Thomas Christiano, ‘Authority’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013, sec. 1, <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority/> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
6  Jack Donnelly, ‘The Discourse of Anarchy in IR’, International Theory 7/3 (2015), 393-425, p. 410.
7   Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), p. 6; John Hermann 
Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics. Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: McKay, 1976), p. 10.
8   A serious shortcoming in realist theorizing of international relations is its focus on states. There are other kinds of 
agents in global politics that influence security and poverty (such as the U.N.). Beitz (1979), p. 41; Thomas Pogge, 
Politics as Usual: What Lies behind the pro-Poor Rhetoric (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010), pp. 34-36. 
Some of these other agents probably also face decisions involving trade-offs between security and poverty.
9  Art and Waltz (1983), p. 6.
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etc.). Acting morally has costs in terms of economic resources, time, diplomatic 
capital, or other. Realists claim that when resources from a state’s limited pool 
are spent on moral pursuits, this always means that less resources are available 
for meeting international security costs. There is also a moderate version of 
premise B which claims that spending resources on moral pursuits often – not 
always – comes at a cost for national security. And there is a weak version as 
well, which claims that spending resources on moral pursuits at least sometimes 
comes at a cost for national security. All three versions highlight that states 
do face trade-offs between national security and moral concerns, so a priority 
ordering between those two considerations is required.
It may seem that there is anarchy within states as well. After all, states are not 
completely effective in restricting aggression between their own inhabitants. 
For that reason, most people protect themselves by locking their doors, moving 
to neighborhoods with reduced crime rates, etc.10 Moreover, these defensive 
expenditures demand resources which individuals cannot use for other ends. So 
perhaps it is not only states, but also individuals who cannot afford to be moral.
Realists answer by adding a second condition to their definition of anarchy. 
Anarchy is not only the absence of an authority which effectively restricts 
aggression, but an authority which effectively restricts aggression to the point 
of preventing the ‘security dilemma.’11 The security dilemma has the following 
form. A state S can never be sure whether another state T will remain pacific 
or will become aggressive. If S consequently chooses to increase its national 
security by spending more resources on defensive means, state T’s national 
security decreases, because S’s defensive means can almost always be used for 
aggression as well. For example, state S’s newly recruited defensive soldiers can 
easily be employed for invading T as well. Even if S is currently non-aggressive, 
T can never be sufficiently sure that S will remain so, since internal political 
changes in S may lead S to adopt an aggressive stance in the future. Now, T 
could respond to its diminished security by arming itself more, but that will 
in turn decrease S’s security, leading to a race with spiraling security costs. 
Within a state territory, on the other hand, individuals enjoy a higher degree 
of reassurance, and are able to deal with any remaining insecurity by using 
means that do not decrease other individuals’ security. My buying a door lock 
or moving to a safer neighborhood does not trigger a security race with other 
individuals. Protection from aggression is therefore substantially costlier for 
states, who thus face much more acute trade-offs between security and moral 
considerations. States cannot afford to be moral, individuals can.
10  Jervis, Robert. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (1978), 167-214, p. 170.
11  Jervis (1978), p. 169.
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Premise C claims that when states pursue national security they are allowed 
and even required to disregard moral commitments if necessary.12 Let me clarify 
the scope and grounds of this claim.
In terms of scope, the realist premise C seems to extend to all moral duties, 
including the duties to reduce global poverty. The claim that states have a duty to 
reduce extreme global poverty is widely accepted in contemporary discussions 
on global justice, both by statist and cosmopolitan authors.13 In this article I 
take it for granted that states have a duty to reduce extreme global poverty, and 
my critique should be taken as addressing only those realists who do not deny 
that there is such a duty. These realists merely claim that the duty is outweighed 
by national security. Now, it is true that realist authors rarely speak about moral 
duties to reduce global poverty, or about how these duties measure up against 
issues of national defense.14 However, the realist claim that national security 
has priority over moral considerations is usually stated in a general form, so 
in principle it covers all moral duties. In any case, regardless of whether realist 
authors implicitly or explicitly claim that the alleged priority of national security 
also extends to global poverty reduction, the claim is worth discussing because 
it is often held in public discourse.15
Regarding the grounds of premise C there are two main views: collectivism 
and individualism. According to collectivism, national security has priority 
over all other considerations because foreign violent aggression may threaten 
12   Raymond Aron, Peace and War; a Theory of International Relations (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 580; 
Art and Waltz (1983), p. 6; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Random 
House, 1950), p. 65; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, ed. Kenneth 
W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 10.
13   Statist who claim that states have duties to reduce global poverty include Michael Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, 
State Coercion, and Autonomy’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 30/3 (2001), 257-296, p. 271; David Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 164;166.; Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem 
of Global Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33/2 (2005), 113-147, p. 118. Cosmopolitans who claim that states 
have duties to reduce global poverty include Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights : Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2002); Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and 
Patriotism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
14   Some realist authors do mention the duty to reduce global poverty. Hans Morgenthau, for example, discusses 
development aid and he seems to imply that aid should not be given to states that could become enemies. (Hans 
J. Morgenthau, ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, The American Political Science Review 56/2 [1962], p. 307). It 
seems that in Morgenthau’s view, then, national security has priority over poverty reduction. On the other hand, 
some contemporary realist authors address global poverty, but they do not address the issue of potential conflicts 
with national security (Terry Nardin, ‘Realism and Right: Sketch for a Theory of Global Justice.’ In Ethical Reasoning 
in International Affairs, ed. Cornelia Navari (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 43-63; Matt Sleat, ‘The Value of 
Global Justice: Realism and Moralism’, Journal of International Political Theory, 12/2 [2016], 169-184), or when 
they do address those conflicts they do not focus on which consideration has normative priority, but on which policy 
strategy could dissolve the conflict (Duncan Bell, ‘Political Realism and International Relations’, Philosophy Compass 
12/2 (2017), 1-12). 
15   See for example David Davenport, ‘Donald Trump’s Budget Raises A Question Of The Ages: What Should 
Government Do (And Not Do)?’, Forbes (March 8, 2017), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport 
/2017/03/08/donald-trumps-budget-raises-a-question-of-the-ages-what-should-government-do-and-not-do/> 
(Accessed: 30 August 2017).
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important collective values, such as political self-determination, the continued 
existence of the state, territorial integrity, and cultural identity. Some realists 
regard these values as supreme.16 According to individualism, on the other 
hand, national security has priority over all other considerations because foreign 
aggression threatens the lives of individual inhabitants. Military invasions (and 
other forms of foreign violent aggression, including international terrorism) 
against one’s country should be prevented at all costs because they are often 
fatal to many human beings, including non-combatants.
In what follows I will deal with premise C in its individualist version only. The 
main reason (which I simply take for granted here) is that individual survival 
matters more than any collective value. Thus, if I manage to show that the 
individualist view is unable to support premise C, then this premise is probably 
indefensible in its collectivist interpretation as well. Moreover, even if we 
granted that individual survival does not matter more than collective values, I 
believe that complex questions become more tractable when each part is treated 
separately. In that sense, this article could be taken as dealing with only part of 
the question whether national security has priority over moral duties, i.e., the 
part that deals with whether securing a state inhabitants’ survival (which would 
be just one reason among others why national security is important) really has 
priority over moral duties.
An incomplete moralist critique
Realism is opposed to what I will call ‘moralism’, the view that moral 
considerations cannot justifiably be put aside even for urgent political reasons. 
Current moralist objections to the argument from anarchy mostly focus on 
rejecting premises A and B. 
Regarding premise A, many critics of realism have noted that it is simply 
not true that international relations are always and everywhere anarchic. 
International law includes rules of war (not only in bello, but also ad bellum) 
which in some cases effectively restrict the use of aggressive force.17 There 
are several coercive mechanisms in place for enforcing compliance with rules 
of war, ranging from mild sanctions such as international disapproval and 
censure, to stronger sanctions such as embargoes and threats of exclusion from 
beneficial agreements and organizations.18 States are also capable of avoiding 
the security dilemma by increasing their defense through means that do not 
significantly decrease other states’ security. Such means include fortifications, 
16  Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 160.
17   Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law’, The University of 
Chicago Law Review. University of Chicago. Law School 72/2 (2005), 469-536.
18  Beitz (1979), p. 47.
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fixed weapons, and mine fields.19
Critics of realism also highlight other structural elements in international 
relations that reduce the likelihood of aggression and increase reassurance. 
First, states are often interdependent in economic, military, climatological, 
and other areas. The level of employment, economic growth, health, etc. in one 
state depend heavily on the degree of cooperation with other states. Since states 
are interested in economic growth, employment, etc., and military aggression 
disrupts international cooperation, interdependence makes aggression less 
likely.20 Another structural element that critics point out is that world powers 
such as the U.S. enjoy a degree of military and economic control over other states 
that seems to protect them from many of the threats posed by international 
anarchy.21
Another problem with premise A is that most foreign military aggressions do 
not primarily aim at killing individuals. Needless to say, genocidal and mass-
murder aggression is not at all absent in human history, but currently many 
wars take the form of ‘political aggressions,’ i.e. aggressions that primarily aim 
at obtaining political or material advantage.22 Political aggression usually poses 
mere conditional threats to life: aggressors only kill if they are met with resistance. 
This is important because premise A is supposed to work in conjunction with 
premise C, which in turn is interpreted in terms of the individual right to life. 
According to this interpretation, the realist argument claims that anarchy 
justifies immoral behavior because if a state acts morally in anarchy it risks its 
inhabitants’ survival. But if the risks in anarchy are often mere political and 
material loss, not loss of life, then conclusion D is considerably weakened.
These critiques have some limits. Although they show that premise A is false 
as a claim about all relations between agents in the international arena, it may 
still be true that relations between some agents are sometimes anarchic and 
risky. Indeed, during some periods of time there are no effective restrictions on 
aggression: sometimes some states do not regard international rules as binding 
in their case, or they are not deterred by sanctions. Moreover, the risk of being 
a victim of aggression – and mass-murder aggression in particular – is real even 
for affluent states, especially in a nuclear age.23 Therefore, a moderate version 
of premise A is still plausible: some international relations are during some 
19  Jervis (1978), p. 203.
20  Beitz (1979), p. 42-45.
21  Ibid. p. 41.
22   David Rodin, ‘The Myth of National Self-Defence’, in The Morality of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 81-82.
23   David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), pp. 207-208.
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periods of time anarchic and risky in terms of national security. So it is worth 
asking if to that limited extent and in those cases national security has priority 
over moral duties.
Premise B is also problematic. This premise, recall, says that national security 
and moral aims are incompatible. I believe that moralists convincingly reject this 
premise in its strong version. National security is not completely incompatible 
with acting morally in the international arena. Acting morally towards foreigners 
often has no costs (and it sometimes brings benefits, see below) for national 
security: ‘issues of foreign policy do not all hang together, with every other issue 
being connected to survival.’24
However, premise B in its moderate and weak versions is convincing. Consider 
for example this article’s main concern, the moral duty to reduce extreme 
global poverty. Certainly, reducing global poverty sometimes requires spending 
resources. So it seems that sometimes a choice needs to be made whether those 
resources should not be used for national security purposes instead.25 Consider 
three concrete examples.
The most straightforward example are national budget decisions. Every 
government has to choose how to distribute its limited resources between the 
national security budget and the foreign aid budget. Affluent states currently 
spend considerable amounts of money and human resources on their militaries 
and their defensive systems – including power-projection and deterrence assets 
– and they also spend some money and human resources on foreign aid.26 Since 
the resource pool is always limited, cutting the national security budget would 
enable them to increase their foreign aid budget, and vice versa. So a decision 
needs to be made as to where to allocate available resources. Besides the cases 
of Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. that were mentioned in the introduction, 
consider now the current situation in South Korea. During the last 30 years this 
state has been steadily increasing its spending on official development aid, now 
reaching 0.14% of its gross national income.27 However, increasing tensions 
with neighboring North Korea may demand additional military spending (for 
example, spending on more missile shields). Cutting back on development aid 
could help gather the required funds. South Korea should therefore decide 
24  Allen E. Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 118.
25   In this article I assume that within the territory of affluent states there is no extreme poverty. This is merely a 
simplifying assumption. National security could of course clash with domestic poverty relief as well. This article’s 
conclusions mostly apply to such cases as well.
26   World Bank, Official Development Assistance (ODA). <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm> (Accessed: 30 
August 2017). World Bank, Military Expenditure (% of GDP). <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.
GD.ZS> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
27   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Net ODA’, <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.
htm> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
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whether trading off foreign aid for national security is permissible in this case, 
or whether the needed defense funds should come from another source.
Of course, budget allocation choices are usually not between just two 
concerns – security and poverty – , but between an appallingly larger number 
of important concerns including education, infrastructure, health, science, arts, 
etc. So it may seem that a focus on security and poverty is arbitrary, since there 
is no reason why additional funds for foreign aid should come from cuts to 
the security budget as opposed to, say, cuts to the arts budget. Now, the very 
claim that additional funds for foreign aid should not come from the security 
budget shows an implicit commitment to the claim that security has priority 
over foreign aid, or at least that both are equally important. This implicit 
commitment stands in need of justification.
The second example are some cases of economic sanctions against countries 
for geopolitical reasons. U.N. sanctions against Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and 
against North Korea since 2013 were publicly justified in terms of national 
security. These countries allegedly possessed (or were developing) weapons of 
mass destruction that could be used against other countries. Now, economic 
sanctions are often linked with increased poverty rates.28 Thus, whenever there 
are no other equally effective means (besides sanctions) to achieve an important 
national security aim, then this aim is in conflict with world poverty reduction.
The third example are cases where global poverty reduction is pursued 
through international institutional reform. Reforming international laws 
on trade barriers, national debt, intellectual property, weapons and resource 
trade, and other areas could have a substantial positive impact on the 
worldwide incidence of poverty.29 Achieving these reforms through the relevant 
international governance institutions would require considerable negotiation 
efforts. Agents trying to get the reforms through would need to spend political 
capital, including both domestic political capital and diplomatic capital. But 
these types of political capital are also required to maintain national security. 
Since political capital is scarce, agents face a choice between spending it on 
national security or on global poverty reduction.
A common reply to premise B and to the sort of examples that I have just 
provided is that fighting poverty abroad may actually strengthen national 
28   Matthias Neuenkirch and Florian Neumeier, ‘Always Affecting the Wrong People? The Impact of US Sanctions on 
Poverty’, University of Trier Research Papers in Economics, 3/15 (2015). <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2590259> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
29   Thomas Pogge and Mitu Sengupta, ‘Rethinking the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Eight Ways to End Poverty Now’, 
Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 7 (2014), 3-11; Fernando R. Tesón and Jonathan Klick, ‘Global Justice and 
Trade’, in Global Justice and International Economic Law: Opportunities and Prospects, ed. Chios Carmody, Frank 
J. Garcia, John Linarelli (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 217-60.
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security. Consider for instance international terrorism, which is currently a 
major national security concern in affluent countries (and non-affluent countries 
as well). It could be argued that poverty is conducive to increased international 
terrorist activity, so fighting poverty could help curb terrorism.30 Conversely, 
it could be argued that spending in military assets is helpful in reducing world 
poverty. For example, humanitarian military interventions – such as the British 
intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, which is widely regarded as successful – 
can stop civil wars, which often cause poverty. Cuts on military spending could 
decrease affluent states’ capacity for similar benign interventions.
Notice that pointing to these important complementarities between the two 
aims (national security and poverty reduction) are not enough to reject premise 
B. The critics need to show that fighting poverty is the best available means 
to increase national security (or, conversely, that military spending is the 
best means to reduce global poverty). Otherwise, there could still be a conflict 
between reducing poverty as much as possible and increasing national security 
as much as possible. My view is that although it is true that in some cases the 
best available means to increase national security are at the same time the best 
available means to reduce global poverty, in many cases the best means for 
one end will be a suboptimal means for the other end. So premise B in its weak 
version still holds.
The most serious shortcoming in most moralist critiques against realism, 
however, is that they leave premise C unchallenged. Those critiques focus on 
premises A and B, but they seem to grant that if premise A and B were right, 
then the realist conclusion would follow. 
Consider for example how Charles Beitz rejects what he calls the ‘Hobbesian 
argument for international skepticism.’31 Beitz reviews several versions of this 
argument. One of those versions is fundamentally the same as the argument 
from anarchy.32 As mentioned above, Beitz convincingly rejects premises A and 
B in the argument from anarchy by showing that even in the absence of a state-
like supranational authority there is currently a reliable expectation that most 
states will comply with rules against military aggression.33 However, Beitz seems 
to concede that premise C (in its individualist version) is fundamentally correct. 
He claims that when an action is required in order to preserve the lives of a state’s 
inhabitants, the action is ‘relatively unobjectionable’ (i.e., unobjectionable from 
30   Susan E. Rice, ‘The National Security Implications of Global Poverty’ in Confronting Poverty: Weak States and 
U.S. National Security, edited by Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 1-22, pp. 28-9.
31  Beitz (1979), p. 14.
32  Ibid. pp. 27-52.
33  Ibid. pp. 46-48.
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the moral point of view), and it is ‘prima facie acceptable.’34
Similarly, other critics of international political realism plausibly show that 
premise B in the argument from anarchy does not work, but they implicitly 
or explicitly concede that premise C is correct. Allen Buchanan, for example, 
rejects premise B by arguing that states are not morally allowed to prioritize 
their own inhabitants’ survival because their survival is not always at stake 
in international politics.35 Implicitly he seems to be conceding that whenever 
survival is indeed at stake, states are morally allowed to prioritize survival over 
moral concern for foreigners. Jack Donnelly also rejects premise B by arguing 
that it is often safe for states to act morally in the international arena. However, 
he concedes that there may be ‘good policy reasons in particular cases to pursue 
an amoral, or even immoral, policy.’36 And he also claims that ‘political leaders 
may be guilty of grievous political misconduct if, in the pursuit of some moral 
goal, they were to sacrifice [...] the lives of its citizens.’37
Finally, other moralist critics correctly notice that premise C is problematic, 
but they fail to adequately explain why. Marshall Cohen, for example, not only 
rejects premise B (by arguing that not all foreign policy aims are inextricably 
tied to physical survival) but he also questions premise C by claiming that 
‘an exclusive concern for one’s own [...] security at the expense of support for 
one’s moral friends, or for those in distress, is open to other kinds of moral 
objection.’38 Cohen here opens the door to moral objections to premise C’s 
alleged priority of compatriots over foreigners. Unfortunately, Cohen does not 
specify which kinds of moral objection premise C is open to, nor when exactly 
those objections apply.
In sum, current moralist critiques against the argument from anarchy are 
incomplete. First, although those critiques show that premises A and B do not 
hold in their stronger forms, I have argued that in weaker forms those premises 
are plausible. Anarchy and risks to security do exist in some circumstances and 
times, and trade-offs between security and poverty reduction are sometimes 
inevitable. Second, since current moralist critiques either accept premise C or 
they do not reject the premise adequately, moralists cannot resist the conclusion 
that in those particular circumstances and times when inhabitants’ physical 
survival is at stake, national security may be rightly prioritized over all (other) 
moral considerations, especially over moral concern for the poor abroad.
34  Ibid. pp. 52, 55.
35  Buchanan (2010), p. 118.
36  Donnelly (1993), p. 106.
37  Ibid. p. 105.
38   Marshall Cohen, ‘Moral Skepticism and International Relations’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 13/4 (1984), 299-346, 
p. 316.
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Completing the moralist critique
The first problem with premise C is that it is incomplete. Why exactly does 
national security – understood as a concern for the physical survival of a state’s 
inhabitants – have priority over all competing moral concerns? One plausible 
answer is that human beings have a fundamental right to life (understood as 
including at least a right to physical survival). The right to life may be regarded 
as a fundamental right in itself,39 as necessary for enjoying other fundamental 
rights,40 or as implied by other fundamental rights, such as the right to 
autonomy.41 Since fundamental moral rights outweigh non-fundamental moral 
considerations, grounding national security in the fundamental right to life 
implies that national security has priority over all non-fundamental moral 
considerations.
Appealing to the right to life, however, is not enough to make sense of premise 
C. After all, national security is not the only means by which a state may secure 
the right to life. Consider for instance domestic economic development. A low 
level of economic development in a state compromises its inhabitants’ right 
to life. If a sufficiently high amount of domestic resources are channeled to 
national security, domestic economic development could be harmed to the 
point of causing starvation and death among the very same people that are being 
protected from foreign aggression. It is not at all clear that in such circumstances 
national security has priority over the concern for economic development, since 
both concerns are grounded in the right to life.
The same problem arises with moral duties towards other states’ inhabitants, 
in particular the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. One of the reasons 
why states have a duty to reduce severe global poverty is that poverty causes 
premature death, and human beings have a right to life. It seems, thus, that 
national security and global poverty relief share the same rationale: securing 
the right to life. Why, then, should the former be prioritized over the latter?42 
Absent a convincing answer, states would not have a permission to disregard 
global poverty reduction when national security is at stake (see the fourth 
section for some attempts at an answer, including the claim that all other things 
equal states are allowed to partially prioritize their own inhabitants). Instead, 
39  See for example John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 42.
40   Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), p. 19.
41  James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 215.
42   Cécile Fabre also highlights that national self-defense and the fight against poverty have a common underlying 
rationale, since both are responses to threats to life and limb. However, her argument goes in a different direction 
from the argument I develop in this article. She claims that if threats to life by foreigners provide a just cause for 
waging war against them, then severe poverty culpably caused by foreigners also provides a just cause for waging war 
against them. Cécile Fabre, Ch.3, ‘Subsistence Wars’ in Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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states would have to assess which course of action in a given context would 
protect more lives. Are more lives saved by attending to national security, to 
global poverty, or partially to both? 
To illustrate the point, take for example the most straightforward example 
of aim incompatibility mentioned above, the one in which resources need to be 
divided between the defense budget and the foreign aid budget. Perhaps in South 
Korea’s particular case more lives could be saved by spending most available 
resources on defense instead of spending them on foreign poverty relief. But 
most other affluent states would probably secure more lives if resources that 
are currently being used for national defense were spent on development aid 
instead. So if realists want to claim that these other states should prioritize 
national defense over their moral duties, they need to provide a more complete 
answer. (In what follows I focus my challenge to realism on the moral duty to 
reduce poverty, leaving aside other moral duties such as the duty to secure the 
right to life of one’s own compatriots through domestic economic development).
Realists could try to vindicate premise C by arguing that national defense 
is a form of self-defense.43 More specifically (since I am interpreting national 
defense in individualist terms) national defense is self-defense by individuals. 
Self-defense justifications are strong, in the sense that they are capable of 
justifying actions that are normally regarded as severely wrong. For instance, 
killing a human is normally severely wrong, but in the case of individual self-
defense, it is permissible (with some restrictions) to kill a lethal aggressor.44 
Arguably it is even permissible to kill an innocent lethal aggressor (as in Robert 
Nozick’s famous ‘falling man’ case.)45 Now, the moral duty not to kill innocents 
is an important one. If self-defense justifications can go as far as allowing agents 
to disregard this important moral duty, then they plausibly also entitle agents 
to disregard less important moral duties, such as the duty not to lie, and maybe 
even the duty not to let others die (from starvation or other causes). After all, 
fighting global poverty involves not self-defense but other-defense: it is about 
saving someone else’s life.46
The first problem with understanding premise C as a claim about national 
self-defense is that the self-defense justification has its limits. Not everything 
43   David Rodin explains that the view that national defense is a form of self-defense has been a standard view since at 
least the early Middle Ages. David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 5.
44   Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, ed. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (New York: 
Oceana, 1964), bk. 2.5.
45  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 34.
46   In a sense, national defense is also mostly a matter of other-defense rather than self-defense: most inhabitants do 
not defend themselves, but they are defended instead by armed forces and public officials. However, it is plausible to 
claim that public officials and armed forces often act on behalf of the state’s inhabitants, so national defense is, after 
all, self-defense.
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is morally permitted when defending oneself. As just war theory and personal 
self-defense theory bring out, self-defensive action is subject to the necessity 
and proportionality conditions. Only if these two conditions are met is it 
permissible to use deadly force against (culpable and innocent) aggressors and 
bystanders. Arguably, those two conditions also apply – in a qualified form – to 
cases in which self-defense requires letting innocents die (either from poverty 
or from other causes). 
Consider first the necessity condition, or last resort condition: killing in self-
defense is permissible only if there is no other less harmful way to achieve the 
defensive aim.47 This condition is met when there is a conflict between national 
self-defense and global poverty reduction. After all, the very fact that there is 
a conflict between two considerations (i.e. that there is no course of action in 
which both considerations could be simultaneously met) implies that there is 
no other way to achieve one aim without sacrificing the other. And if there is no 
other way, then there is no less harmful way. Of course, one may doubt whether 
it is ever the case that there is really no other way to improve national defense 
besides cutting back on the fight against poverty, i.e., one may doubt premise 
B. But we saw above that at least in its weak version this premise is plausible.
Consider now the proportionality condition. This condition is met when the 
morally weighted benefits achieved by self-defensive means outweigh the morally 
weighted costs that those means will bring about.48 As mentioned above, killing 
a lethal aggressor is usually regarded as proportionate, even if the aggressor is 
innocent. If it is proportionate to kill an innocent person in defending yourself, 
it is surely proportionate to let an innocent person die in defending yourself (as 
in the case of letting a foreigner die of poverty). Therefore, the proportionality 
condition seems to be met when national defense and global poverty reduction 
clash.
But the proportionality condition is sensitive to numbers. For instance, it is 
impermissible to wage self-defensive war (or to perform a particular act during 
a war) if the number of innocents that would likely be killed is sufficiently 
higher than the number of people that would be saved from an unjust military 
aggression. Along the same lines it could be argued that if the number of people 
that would be necessarily left to die by engaging in self-defense is sufficiently 
higher than the number of people that would be saved from a foreign 
aggression, it is impermissible to engage in self-defense and leave the former 
to die. Now, this sort of disproportion sometimes occurs when national defense 
47   Seth Lazar, ‘War’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, sec. 2.5, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2016/entries/war/> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
48  Ibid.
GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (10/2) 2017 
ISSN: 1835-6842
81FRANCISCO GARCÍA-GIBSON
and global poverty reduction clash. If, for instance, thousands could be saved 
from starvation with the money spent on building a single piece of armament 
that only marginally increases the chances of successfully defending just a few 
compatriots, then the proportionality condition is probably not met. Former 
U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower eloquently described this disproportion as 
follows: 
The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school 
in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a 
town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It 
is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane 
with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer 
with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.49
The second problem with understanding premise C as a claim about national 
self-defense is that most efforts to increase national security do not strictly 
qualify as self-defensive action. Notice first that there are two different ways 
in which an agent may pursue the aim of national defense: (a) working now to 
increase the probability of successful self-defense against (or deterrence of) a 
potential, temporally distant attack; or (b) pre-empting an imminent attack or 
stopping an ongoing attack. (A threat of violent aggression is imminent when it 
is specific and temporally proximate.)50 
Strictly speaking, ‘self-defense’ only refers to cases in which an aggression 
is ongoing or imminent. It may seem arbitrary to limit the use of the term 
‘self-defense’ only to those cases. However, when an aggression is ongoing or 
imminent, the defender acquires a set of extensive permissions that she does 
not acquire when the threat is not imminent or ongoing. For example, I am 
allowed to kill someone who is pointing a gun at me, but not someone who is 
planning to kill me next week, even if I am sure she is seriously planning it. 
At most, I may destroy the means she is planning to use (if I can do it without 
putting her at risk). Given their different moral implications, it is important to 
keep both types of cases apart. Thus it will be helpful to use a different term 
for each: ‘self-defense’ for imminent or ongoing threats, ‘self-protection’ for 
temporally more distant threats.
Most of the time affluent countries are not facing any imminent or ongoing 
foreign aggression, at least since the end of World War II. A substantial amount 
of resources they allocate to national security is directed at deterring, and 
49   Dwight David Eisenhower, ‘The Chance for Peace’, in White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters, ed. 
Robert Schlesinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), pp. 74-75.
50   Noam Lubell, ‘The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law, ed. M. Weller, Alexia Solomou, and Jake William Rylatt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
697-719.
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preparing themselves against, unspecified and temporally distant attacks. So 
we need to re-describe the normative conflict that affluent states most often 
face between national security and global poverty relief. What states really have 
to choose between is: taking a certain measure that reduces the risk of civilian 
death by a non-specific, temporally distant foreign aggression, and taking an 
alternative measure that reduces the risk of death of destitute foreigners by a 
specific, temporally proximate lethal threat: hunger, lack of shelter, or lack of 
basic health care. This is not a conflict between self-defense and poverty relief, 
but a conflict between self-protection and poverty relief.
May national self-protection be prioritized over poverty relief? Individual 
self-protection is subject to the same proportionality constraint as individual 
self-defense, but the constraint is even more demanding in the case of self-
protection. Letting people die as a means of self-protection can only be justified 
if the number of individuals that are being protected is substantially larger than 
the number of individuals that are being let to die. So in cases where a state must 
choose between protecting a number of people from future military aggression 
and saving an equal or even moderately larger number of people from death by 
poverty, the state must choose the latter.
Objections
Realists could try to rescue premise C by resorting to the idea of role duties. 
Persons occupying social roles are expected to comply with certain duties, and 
this fact seems to have some moral weight. For instance, the role of being a 
public intellectual seems to generate a moral duty to think diligently and 
seriously about current political issues. Similarly, state leaders are expected to 
further national security.51 In this vein, a realist could argue that if a state leader 
ever sacrificed national security in order to reduce global poverty, she would be 
violating her role duties and therefore committing a moral wrong.
Of course, not all role duties are also moral duties. The mere fact that an 
agent plays a role that is customarily associated with certain duties does not 
mean that these are moral duties, or that she has moral permission to comply 
with them. The leader of a suicidal cult may have a role duty to administer 
poison to the other cult members, but that is not enough to show that she has 
an actual moral duty or permission to administer it. In order to be actual moral 
duties, role duties have to be morally justifiable.52 Now, the realist is right in 
claiming that the role of a state leader is not like that of a suicidal cult leader. 
In broad terms, the duties that are associated with being a state leader seem 
51  Morgenthau (2016), p. 42; Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 42.
52   Anthony Coady, ‘The Problem of Dirty Hands’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, sec. 4, <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dirty-hands/> (Accessed: 30 August 2017).
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to be morally justifiable: securing human rights for its inhabitants, promoting 
equality, increasing national security, etc. all seem to be morally permissible 
and even morally required activities.
Notice, however, that even morally justifiable role duties are not morally 
supreme. They are sometimes outweighed by general moral duties.53 Consider 
the case of a priest who hears in confession that someone is planning to murder 
someone else. It seems that the general moral duty to protect the third person 
from being killed outweighs the priest’s (morally justifiable) role duty to keep 
confessions confidential. So in some extreme cases, general morality can 
outweigh role morality. Now, the appeal to role duties by those defending the 
argument from anarchy seems to operate in the opposite way.54 The idea seems 
to be that in cases which are not extreme (when national security is not at stake), 
political leaders must conform to general moral duties, while in cases which are 
extreme general duties are outweighed by role duties. 
Thus if role duties are to be part of a realist argument for prioritizing national 
security, a different sort of argument needs to be made. Realists need to show 
that political roles are not like most roles. They need to show that general moral 
duties, which usually outweigh role obligations in extreme cases, are not strong 
enough as to outweigh political role obligations.
But what makes political roles so special? The usual answer here is that 
international political action is special because it takes place in an anarchic 
realm. In anarchic realms life is at stake, so international political action 
is subject to less strict moral constraints than action in less risky realms. 
The problem with this answer is that at this point the recourse to the idea of 
role duties becomes superfluous. That idea was supposed to supplement the 
argument from anarchy, not just repeat it.
Another option open to realists is to try to vindicate premise C by resorting to 
the idea of reasonable partiality for co-nationals or compatriots. In the global 
justice debate nationalists and statists argue that the fact of sharing a nation 
or a state (respectively) can ground special duties regarding socioeconomic 
distribution, defense, etc. which allow or even require prioritizing a state’s 
inhabitants over non-inhabitants. This view is criticized by cosmopolitans, who 
argue that special relationships such as nationality or statehood cannot ground 
a permission (or a duty) to be partial, or that those relationships only ground 
a permission to be partial once certain basic general duties towards all human 
53   Brian Barry, Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 165-6; Caney (2005), 
p. 140.
54  Coady (2014), sec. 4.
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beings have been reasonably fulfilled.55 In the remaining of this section I argue 
that regarding the right to life nationalism and statism can justify a kind of 
priority for a state’s inhabitants that is, at most, remarkably weak.
There are two kinds of view about justified partiality towards co-inhabitants: 
instrumental and non-instrumental (or principled) views. Instrumentalist 
views grant that as a matter of principle there is no difference between a state’s 
duties towards inhabitants and towards non-inhabitants, so the same duties to 
secure physical survival are owed equally to all. However, instrumentalist views 
argue that an effective way to fulfill those duties is to distribute them among 
states.56 If each state focuses on securing survival to its own inhabitants before 
taking care of non-inhabitants, the overall amount of individuals who will see 
their physical survival being secured will be higher than if each state tries to 
secure physical survival to all human beings at once. 
The main problem with instrumental views is that they depend on it being 
empirically true that prioritizing inhabitants over non-inhabitants is the best 
available way to fulfill general duties. As even instrumentalist authors concede, 
in the present world system the empirical conditions for an effective distribution 
of general duties are not met.57 On one hand, some states are incapable or 
unwilling to adequately secure their inhabitants right to life, so if other more 
able or willing states do not help – even at some cost to their own inhabitants’ 
right to life – , the overall satisfaction of that right would probably be lower. On 
the other hand, developments in communication and transport make it easier 
than in the past for a state to secure the right to life of people in other states. 
Therefore, the claim that states are sufficiently more efficient in securing that 
right in their own territories than in other territories – so as to justify a strict 
division of moral labor between states – is doubtful.
Non-instrumental views, on the other hand, claim that there are principled 
reasons for at least sometimes prioritizing state inhabitants over non-
inhabitants.58 At first sight, these views seem to be denying that all human 
beings have equal moral worth. Indeed, such views seem to imply that not all 
humans should be treated equally, with some deserving preferential treatment 
due to arbitrary facts such as place of birth. Non-instrumentalist views try to 
meet this egalitarian challenge in two ways. One way is to claim that allowing 
for special duties towards compatriots does not imply denying the principle of 
55  Tan (2004), p. 158.
56   Robert E. Goodin, ‘What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?’, Ethics 98/4 (1988), 663-686, p. 678; Gillian 
Brock, ‘Global Justice, Cosmopolitan Duties and Duties to Compatriots: The Case of Healthcare’, Public Health Ethics 
8/2 (2015), 110-120, p. 113.
57  Goodin (1988), p. 686.
58  Miller (2007); Nagel (2005).
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equal moral worth, because those duties are simply the result of applying the 
principle of equal moral worth to particular circumstances.59 The other attempt 
to meet the egalitarian challenge is to grant that there is a tension between 
duties that arise from the principle of equal worth and duties that arise from 
the non-instrumental value of special relationships, but since we have good 
reasons to acknowledge both kinds of duties we must try to find a reasonable 
accommodation between them.60 Instead of assessing whether these answers 
are plausible in terms of their grounds, I will assess them in terms of their 
implications. Consider a case in which due to limited resources a state is forced 
to choose whether to secure physical survival to one of its inhabitants – whose 
life is threatened by foreign military aggression – or to a non-inhabitant – whose 
life is threatened by severe poverty. Both non-instrumentalist views claim that, 
all other things equal, the state must prioritize its own inhabitant because on 
top of the state’s general duty to protect the lives of both individuals, the state 
has an adequately grounded special duty to its own inhabitant. In terms of the 
principle of equal moral worth, both individuals equally deserve protection. But 
special duties break the tie.
Now imagine that instead of having to choose between two individuals (one 
inhabitant and one non-inhabitant), a state is forced to choose between securing 
physical survival to a single inhabitant and securing physical survival to two non-
inhabitants. Are special duties to the inhabitant strong enough as to outweigh 
the general duty to secure physical survival to one additional non-inhabitant? 
It seems to me that we cannot allow special duties that much strength, at least 
as long as we are committed to the principle of equal moral worth of all human 
beings, and to the idea that the right to life is truly fundamental (while nationhood 
– and statehood – based rights are not). Therefore, non-instrumentalist forms 
of nationalism and statism are only capable of justifying a weak kind of priority: 
priority in cases of complete tie-break. As soon as the choice involves a slight 
difference in terms of the number of individuals in danger, all traces of priority 
vanish.
Concluding remarks
The argument from anarchy makes a strong case for the claim that affluent states 
may disregard their duties to reduce extreme world poverty. The argument points 
out that fighting poverty abroad sometimes compromises national security, and 
in an anarchic international arena this means that individual lives are put at 
risk. The present article has argued that national security reasons have their 
59  Blake (2001), pp. 260-261.
60   Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 7; 76.
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limits. After all, fighting extreme global poverty is about saving lives as well. 
Actions promoting national security must meet proportionality constraints. It 
is impermissible to increase national security for a certain number of people at 
the cost of omitting an action that could save a larger number of people from 
severe poverty abroad. This proportionality constraint is especially stringent 
when aggression against affluent states is neither ongoing nor imminent, but 
relatively distant, as is sometimes the case for affluent states. Two attempts to 
salvage the argument from anarchy were analyzed and found lacking. Appeals 
to political leaders’ role duties and to the alleged priority of compatriots or co-
nationals are not enough to show that national security has priority over global 
poverty relief.61
61   I would like to thank Charles Beitz, Cristián Rettig, Jürgen Sirsch, and participants at the Symposium on Human 
Rights, Exploitation and Cosmopolitan Justice (Buenos Aires, 2016) for their invaluable comments.
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